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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to measure the effect of wealth on property victimization risk. Using data from two household
victimization surveys conducted in São Paulo city and a measure of spending as a proxy for wealth observed by criminals, the
conclusion was reached that wealth level is one of the determinants of victimization risk. This risk increases with this variable, but
it reaches a maximum level from which it declines as wealth levels increase.
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Resumo
O objetivo é mensurar o efeito da riqueza no risco de vitimizac¸ão contra a propriedade. Utilizando dados de duas pesquisas
domiciliares de vitimizac¸ão realizadas na cidade de São Paulo, e uma medida de despesa realizada como proxy para a riqueza
observada pelos criminosos, conclui-se que o nível de riqueza é um dos determinantes do risco de vitimizac¸ão. O risco cresce com
essa variável, mas atinge um ponto de máximo, a partir do qual se reduz para maior riqueza.
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.  Introduction
The first difficulty in investigating the causes of crime is that reliable information is hard to come by (or virtually
on-existent). Existing official data, especially that available in police records, consists only in underestimated figures
or actually committed crimes. The number of criminal occurrences is underestimated because many of them are not
ctually registered in a formal police report.2
The high amount of crimes that are not reported by their victims (underreporting of crimes), which is particularly true
or some types of crimes, such as robberies, kidnappings and rapes, leads to the mismeasurement of crime indicators.
his can skew the results of empirical studies if the analyst does not use an appropriate strategy to circumvent the
roblem.
Actually, as suggested by victimization surveys conducted in Brazil and abroad,3 there is clear evidence that the
ctual crime rate is significantly higher than that reported based on official data. In other words, the official figures
nderestimate the scale of crime that has such a negative impact on the lives of citizens. Therefore, albeit useful for
uiding public security actions, the data contained in police records is not sufficient for one to know the actual crime
ate to which society is exposed to. As an attempt to correct this situation, victimization surveys began to be carried
ut in the United States in the 1960s. These surveys are based on a random sample of a given population, which is
sked about instances of certain types of crimes in a given period of time. Besides allowing for better measurement of
he actual crime rate, among other advantages, these surveys make it possible for one to know the characteristics of
he victims and provide important inputs for empirical studies on the causes of criminal victimization.
Since crime reduces social welfare, economists have also been studying this additional issue.4 The many other
heories that attempt to explain the causes of crime include that of the criminal’s rational choice, originated in the
eminal work of Becker (1968), which was expanded by Ehrlich (1973). Although some economic studies on the
auses of crime have already been carried out in the past (e.g. Fleisher, 1963, 1966; Smigel-Leibowistz, 1965; Ehrlich,
967),5 it was only after Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) that empirical studies could be based on an economic
heory. Since then, economists have been increasingly involved in surveys along these lines. However, the analyses
ere often focused on criminals’ behavior, meaning that they were mainly intended to identify the main causes of the
ecision to commit a crime. Empirical evidence has usually held the arguments of the economic theory on deterrence,
xpected return on, and opportunity cost of crime. But little is known about the factors that influence the likelihood of
n individual being victimized, namely, their victimization risk. This is so because most studies used data aggregated
y countries, states or municipalities. With data from victimization surveys, however, one can study the determinants
f criminal victimization using a sample of individual data. This type of data makes it possible to control for the main
haracteristics of individuals with a bearing on victimization risk, such as their age and gender.
Among previous studies that investigated the determinants of victimization risk, we can cite Witte (1980), Sparks
1981), Meier and Miethe (1993), Miethe and McDowall (1993) and Levitt (1999). In Brazil, the empirical analyses
f determinants of victimization risk carried out by Carneiro (2000), Beato et al. (2004), Gomes and Paz (2008) and
adalozzo and Furtado (2011) deserve special attention. Apart from these studies, three recent Brazilian studies on
he causes of victimization should be highlighted. Gomes (2011) investigated the importance of the spatial dimension
n connection with the risk of becoming a victim of household theft or burglary in São Paulo city; Peixoto et al.
2011) analyzed the determinants of victimization based on a systemic perspective of criminal dynamics, with the aim
f understanding the causes of changes in victimization patterns between 2003 and 2008 in the city of São Paulo;
corzafave et al. (2011) carried out a general analysis of the determinants of the risk of becoming a victim of property
2 A police report involves assessments and decisions of various individuals involved in an event seen as a “police matter”. Santos and Kassouf
2008) describe the standard referral of cases seen a priori as “criminal events” and discuss key factors that influence the decision to actually register
 victimization case with law enforcement.
3 The two main victimization surveys carried out abroad are the British Crime Survey, which today is called Crime Survey for England, and
he National Crime Victimization Survey. Madalozzo and Furtado (2011) listed victimization surveys carried out in Brazil that were finalized and
isseminated until August 2009. The Special Supplements on Food Security, Victimization and Justice included in the National Household Sample
urvey of 2009, carried out by IBGE, was added to that list.
4 Santos and Kassouf (2008) briefly describe the involvement of economists, particularly in Brazil, in a research area referred to as Economics of
rime. Specifically, this study includes a section dealing with the importance of economists in investigating the causes of crime.
5 The two latter studies were mentioned by Ehrlich (1973).
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crimes and crimes against persons. This study also investigated possible causes for the underreporting of crimes along
the lines of studies previously conducted by Santos and Kassouf (2008) and Madalozzo and Furtado (2011).
Victimization is a complex process and, consequently, one that is difficult to be modeled empirically. There is a no
single well-structured theory to guide empirical analyses.6 Studies have usually been based on two approaches that
consider victims as objects of study, highlighting the importance of their “lifestyle” and creation of “opportunities” for
criminals to carry out their crimes. Empirical analyses have been mainly based on the theoretical framework proposed
by Cohen et al. (1981). Based on some previous studies, these authors expanded and formalized a sociological theory
(which they refer to as the “opportunity model of predatory victimization”) to explain victimization risk. In this approach
there are five factors which are strongly related to risk: exposure, proximity, guardianship, target attractiveness, and
definitional proprieties of specific crimes.
There seems to be no empirical literature rejecting the approach proposed by these authors. The main open issue
is that of which variables have a bearing on the first four factors. What can be said, for example, about the effects of
being wealthy on becoming a victim of property crimes, such as theft and robbery.
Hypothetically, wealth has a twofold bearing on victimization risk according to Cohen et al. (1981). On the one
hand, wealthier individuals are more economically attractive for criminals, meaning that more observed wealth implies
greater victimization risk. On the other hand, wealthier individuals have stronger reasons and more money to spend
on their own security.7 Therefore, the effect of wealth on victimization risk is ambiguous, so only its net effect can be
observed empirically.
Considering the level of spending of potential victims with protection and criminals with heterogeneous skills,
Gomes and Paz (2008) conclude that there might be an increasing, but not monotonic, relationship between the income
of a citizen and his or her property victimization risk. These authors empirically analyzed the effect of individual
characteristics and size of cities on victimization risk using data for 104 cities in the state of São Paulo. The results
showed that victimization risk does not increase monotonically with the victims’ income. Three possible explanations
for this type of relationship are presented, among which private spending on protection is the most plausible one.
In this study, per capita income levels was controlled for by five dummy variables. Using the lowest income levels
(poor people) as the omitted variable, the coefficients for the other variables related to higher social classes (lower
middle class, middle class, upper middle class, and high class) showed positive and statistically significant coefficients.
Marginal effects on victimization risk increased up to the upper middle class, but the marginal effect for the rich was
lower than that estimated for members of the upper middle class. This provides evidence that victimization risk does not
increase monotonically with income. Controlling for the effect of income through dummy variables defined by social
classes, Madalozzo and Furtado (2011) also observed that the marginal effect of income on the risk of victimization,
albeit positive, depends on the social class under consideration.
This study focuses on analyzing the effect of wealth observed by criminals – approximated by total monthly per capita
household spending – on property victimization risk, specifically victimization in the form of household theft/robbery
and theft/robbery of persons.8 This issue is not addressed in depth in previous empirical analyses, especially analyses
carried out with data from victimization surveys conducted in Brazil. The hypothesis guiding the study is that the
risk of property victimization increases with the wealth level observed by criminals as a result of its greater economic
attractiveness, but such increase occurs at decreasing rates according to the victim’s capacity to spend more on private
security, so much so that from a certain wealth level the risk decreases as wealth rises. In other words, the risk of
criminal victimization increases with observed wealth until a maximum level is reached, from which it decreases as the
wealth rises. Investigating this hypothesis is the main objective of this study. This paper is structured as follows: Section
2 presents a brief description of a useful theoretical framework for discussing the effect of wealth on victimization
risk; Section 3 provides details about the empirical modelling; Section 4 presents a preliminary analysis; results are
discussed in Section 5; Section 6 concludes the study.
6 Summarizing the main theoretical approaches to the causes of crime, Cerqueira and Lobão (2004) says that the lifestyle theory (mainly developed
in the work of Hindelang et al., 1978) is not, stricto sensu, a crime causation theory.
7 According to data from the Special Supplement of the National Household Sample Survey of 2009, the feeling of insecurity in Brazil increases
significantly as the per capita household income rises. For example, in the metropolitan area of São Paulo, 42.9% of the individuals with a per capita
household income below one-quarter of the minimum wage felt safe. This percentage decreases as the income level increases, to the point of being
up to 12.7 percentage points lower for people earning two or more minimum wages.
8 The definition of observed wealth and justifications for the choice of a spending measure as proxy will be duly presented in Section 3.
2A
o
a
w
(
p
u
t
c
f
t
c
i
p
a
b
w
c
c
T
i
p
w
t
aM. Justus, A.L. Kassouf / EconomiA 14 (2013) 88–101 91
.  Wealth  and  victimization
In the previous section, we presented factors that, according to Cohen et al. (1981), determine the risk of victimization.
s indicated in this section’s title, we are trying to understand the effect of wealth on determining an individual’s risk
f becoming a victim of property crime, admittedly seen as an economically motivated crime. In order to check any
lleged effect of wealth on the risk of victimization, we specifically relied on the work of Gaviria and Pagés (2002),
ho proposed a simple victimization model that is useful for the discussion carried out in this study.
The model’s framework involves two actors (citizens and criminals) and two stages. In the first stage, citizens
who are only different from one another according to their wealth level) decide how much they will spend on private
rotection. In the second stage, citizens are matched with criminals who in turn decide whether or not to commit a crime
pon observing the wealth (w) of their prospective victims and their investments on private protection (e). Assuming
hat criminals make their decisions on the basis mere pecuniary factors, weighing two factors: if they are successful in
ommitting the crime, they are rewarded with a portion of the victim’s wealth given by α  times w  (α  ≤  1), and if they
ail9 – the probability of which is p  – they pay a penalty equivalent to F.
Three additional assumptions are made: the probability of apprehension is assumed to increase monotonically with
he spending in private protection (i.e. p  = p(e), where p′ > 0); victims and criminals are considered as risk-neutral;
riminals are assumed to have complete information in that they observe their victim’s wealth and are able to correctly
nfer their risks of being apprehended.
In this context, a criminal will attempt to victimize citizen i  who possesses a wealth of wi and have spent ei in
rivate protection as long as the following inequality holds
(1 −  p[ei])αwi −  p[ei]F  >  0 (1)
Since all citizens are potential victims for criminals, a given citizen i can avoid becoming a victim if he or she spends
t least hi on private protection, where hi indicates the spending on protection that would make a criminal indifferent
etween attempting to steal from i doing it because the risk involved is very high. In short,
hi =  p(−1)
[
αwi
αwi +  F
]
(2)
here p(−1) is the inverse of function p  that links private spending in protection to the probabilities of punishing a
riminal.
Eq. (2) gives, for each wealth level, the minimal spending on private protection required to prevent crime by deterring
riminals. Therefore, citizens must decide whether they will spend hi on their own protection or do not invest at all.
hey will spend hi only if it does not exceed the prospective losses of being victimized. That is, if
hi ≤ αwi. (3)
Wealthier persons would need, ceteris  paribus, greater spending in private protection to avoid victimization. This
s the conclusion reached based on the first derivative of expression (2) with respect to w,
dhi
dwi
= αF(F  +  αwi)2p′[h]
> 0 (4)
But are wealthier persons willing to spend more on protection to prevent being victimized? Or will they instead
refer to bear some risk? The answer depends on the second derivative of h  with respect to w,
d2hi
dw2i
=  −α
2F (2(F  +  αwi)p′[hi]2 +  Fp′′[hi])
(F  +  αwi)4p′[hi]3
(5)Eq. (5) will be negative, unless the second derivative of p  is both negative and large in absolute value. So the wealthy
ill routinely spending in private security in order to avoid being victimized unless p  exhibits sharp diminishing returns
o scale.
9 The authors have not point this out, but one must consider that failure means that the criminal was accused, arrested, convicted, and punished
s provided for in the law.
92 M. Justus, A.L. Kassouf / EconomiA 14 (2013) 88–101
If the marginal returns of an extra amount spent in private protection against crime are very low, the wealthy will
find it too expensive to reach the necessary level of protection to prevent being victimized and will rationally decide to
bear some crime. Otherwise, they will spend the portion of their wealth deemed necessary to avoid being victimized.
In summary, according to the approach adopted by Gaviria and Pagés (2002), the wealth of individuals determines
both their economic attractiveness as victims and their capacity to protect themselves from criminals by paying for
their protection.
According to the findings of Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973), Cohen et al. (1981) and Gaviria and Pagés (2002) it is to
be expected that, given the opportunity cost of crime, the likelihood of failure determined by government spending on
public safety, the penalties provided for in the law, and the costs involved in planning and committing a crime, criminals
will pick their victims based on their evaluation of those who are more economically attractive for the criminal act. In
this subjective evaluation, criminals take into account both the wealth of potential victims and the likelihood of failure
determined by how much they spend on their own protection. By doing this, criminals optimize the expected return on
crime. Therefore, the behavior of potential victims has a direct bearing on the optimization process that is implicit in
the rational choice of a criminal. Thus, if the principle of economic rationality on the part of criminals holds, the risk
of victimization increases with wealth. However, as pointed out by Gaviria and Pagés (2002), wealthier individuals
have stronger reasons and more money to spend on their own security to protect themselves from criminals. On the
other hand, poorer individuals lack the financial means to pay for their protection to avoid being victimized, but are
less economically attractive potential victims to criminals than wealthier individuals.
3.  Empirical  modelling
The data set used in the estimations of these models is made up of a pooled cross section of two victimization
surveys conducted in São Paulo city in 2003 and 2008 by the Future Brazil Institute10 and the company Ipsos Public
Affairs, which carried out the sampling process and interviews and set up the database. In those surveys, the period
analyzed with respect to victimizations was a one-year period.
We chose two types of crime against property to make the empirical analyses: household theft/robbery and
theft/robbery of persons. For household theft/robbery, the surveyed individuals were asked whether anything had
been stolen from their home during the period covered by the survey; for theft/robbery of persons, the surveyed indi-
viduals were asked whether they had had any good stolen or if they had been robbed of any good outside their home,
vacation home, or vehicle during the period covered by the survey.
In the first and second editions, 5000 and 2967 households were surveyed, respectively. The observations were
filtered to derive appropriate samples for the estimates. There are missings in some of the variables. Moreover, unlike
previous studies using the same database as the one used in this study, only observations related to respondents who
reported that they and their families had been living in their current home for at least one year, which is the period
covered by the questions on criminal occurrences involving people living in the household, were kept in the sample
that was used in the theft/robbery estimations. Although it implied the exclusion of 676 observations, this filter was
applied to reduce imprecision in the estimates. The numbers of remaining observations for estimating the statistical
models for the crimes of household theft/robbery and theft/robbery of persons was 5076 and 5581, respectively.
The response variable of the models is binary, defined by the occurrence of at least one type of crime analyzed
over the period covered by the victimization surveys (victimi). It assumes value 1 if the individual i was victimized
and 0 otherwise. Given this characteristic of the dependent variable, the empirical modelling of the determinants of
property victimization is made through the probit models estimated by the maximum likelihood method.11 The general
specification of the estimated statistical models is as follows:Pr(victimi =  1) =  (xiβ) (6)
  is the normal cumulative distribution, x is a row vector that contains the control variables and a constant, and β  is
the column vector of coefficients.
10 As of February 2009, all the activities carried out by this institute were transferred to the Public Policy Center (CPP), which was incorporated
into Insper – Institute of Education and Research. Once again, we thank the CPP for its support.
11 For a review of binary choice models, we suggest Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 2009).
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In Section 1, it was highlighted that this study is interested in the hypothetical relationship between wealth and
ictimization risk. In the previous section, which deals with the existence of this relationship theoretically, three
dditional hypotheses assumed by Gaviria and Pagés (2002) were pointed out. We believe that the strongest one is that
criminals are assumed to have complete information in that they observe their victim’s wealth and are able to correctly
nfer their risks of being apprehended”. It should also be recalled that the probability of apprehension is assumed to
ncrease monotonically with the spending in private protection, which is a share of actual wealth. It is obvious that
riminals are not aware of the actual wealth of their prospective victims and much less can they know how much they
pend on protection. It is more likely that they can estimate and compare wealth among prospective victims based on
hat they can actually observe. In this regard, we use a measure of spending incurred by potential victims to reflect
he wealth observed by criminals.
In this context, the variable of interest for this empirical analysis is the total monthly per capita household spending
hereinafter just spending) as measured in reals in 2003 (spending).12 And in order to control for and test any possible
onlinearity in the relationship between observed wealth and victimization, the square of this variable is also used.
The other control variables, which are common to the two types of crime are: age in years (age); a dummy variable
o distinguish gender, which assumes value 1 for males and 0 for females (gender); a dummy variable to distinguish
olor or race (race), which assumes value 1 for white or Asian (yellow) and value 0 for black, mulatto or indigenous
eople.
In the household theft/robbery victimization model, there are two specific controls: a dummy variable to distinguish
lace of residence, which assumes value 1 if the residence is located in a slum, in a project or near a slum or 0 if there
s a slum nearby; a dummy variable to distinguish the type of residence, which assumes value 1 if it is a regular house
nd 0 if it is a house or apartment in a gated community.
In the household theft/robbery victimization model, there are two specific controls: a dummy variable to distinguish
lace of residence (place), which assumes value 1 if the residence is located in a slum, in a project or near a slum or 0
f there is a slum nearby; a dummy variable to distinguish the type of residence (house), which assumes value 1 if it is
 house and 0 if it is a house/apartment in a gated community.
And in the victimization model for theft/robbery of persons, the specification contains: a dummy variable to distin-
uish the occupation status (works), which assumes value 1 if the individual works outside the home and 0 otherwise;
nd a interaction dummy variable (age  ×  gender).
Finally, in order to control for time effects on both types of crime, the specifications contain a dummy variable to
istinguish the year of the victimization survey (time), which assumes value 1 if the observation refers to the 2008
urvey and 0 if it refers to the one carried out in 2003.
Still for household theft/robbery, unlike previous studies based on the same database used in this study, information
bout the head of the household with regard to gender, age and color is used.13
Once all variables are defined, the model expressed in Eq. (6) is rewritten for each of the types of crime under
nalysis. The specifications of the victimization models for household theft/robbery and theft/robbery of persons are
s follows, respectively:
Pr(victimi =  1) =  (β0 +  β1spendingi +  β2spending2i +  β3agei +  β4genderi +  β5racei +  β6placei
+  β7housei +  β8time)
(7)
12 The figures for 2008 were deflated using the National Consumer Price Index (INPC). We opted for a measure of spending rather than for a
easure of income for three reasons. First, because the questions on the income of people living in the household were closed questions by income
rackets, which makes them inappropriate to test the hypothesis guiding this study. This could be circumvented by using the measure of personal
ncome of the respondents (from work and other sources). But because it was only related to the respondent, using it was seen as inappropriate for
easuring wealth observed by criminals, especially in the case of household theft/robbery. Second, measures of income are admittedly biased. Third
nd most importantly in our opinion, we believe that spending reflects wealth observable by criminals better than income. It is recognized, however,
hat the measure of spending that was used is only an approximation of the true amount spent by members of the household. However, since the
uestion asked to the respondents allowed them not to report total spending or not to be aware of this total spending, it substantially reduced the
ikelihood of measurement errors in connection with this variable.
13 Scorzafave et al. (2011) kept in the sample only the respondents who were heads of household; Peixoto et al. (2011) used the attributes of the
espondents regardless of their status in the household; Gomes (2011) did not control for any of these attributes in the estimates; Madalozzo and
urtado (2011) considered the respondents’ gender and color and the average age in the household.
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Table 1
Definition, mean and standard deviation (SD) of the variables by type of theft/robbery.
Variable Definition Household Persons
Mean SD Mean SD
victim 1 if victimized and 0 otherwise 0.0660 0.2483 0.08385 0.2772
spending Total monthly per capita household spending in reals in 2003 359.13 445.64 360.03 442.77
age Age in years 38.56 15.85 38.03 15.66
gender 1 if man and 0 if woman 0.5228 0.4995 0.5212 0.4996
race 1 if white or Asian (yellow) and 0 otherwise 0.6032 0.4893 0.5967 0.4906
time 1 if the observation is from the 2008 survey and 0 if it is from the 2003 one 0.4050 0.4910 0.3931 0.4885
place 1 if the residence is in a slum, near a slum or in a project and 0 otherwise 0.4143 0.4926
house 1 if the residence is a regular house and 0 otherwise 0.7843 0.4114
works 1 if works outside the home and 0 otherwise 0.5078 0.4999
≥Note: The number of observations are 5076 and 5581, respectively.
and
Pr(victimi =  1) =  (β0 +  β1spendingi +  β2spending2i +  β3agei +  β4genderi +  β5racei +  β6worksi
+  β7(age  ×  gender)i +  β8time) (8)
It should be remembered that the hypothesis to be tested is: the risk of criminal victimization increases as the
spending rises, but it reaches a maximum level from which the risk drops as spending levels increase. This hypothesis
will not be rejected if coefficients ˆβ1 and ˆβ2 in the two models specified above are statistically significant and have
positive and negative signs, respectively. Moreover, maximum spending should remain within the interval of the data
analysis. For both types of theft/robbery, the figures for minimum and maximum spending are, respectively, 6 and 7000
reals.
Expectations about the signs of the other coefficients in the model expressed in Eqs. (7) and (8) are compared with
empirical evidence in Section 5. Except for the proxy for observed wealth, expectations for the other variables are
limited to the patterns identified in the descriptive analyses presented in the next section. This is so because apart from
the fact that there is no well-structured theoretical model to guide expectations, it is almost impossible to identify the
channels through which these control variables influence the risk of victimization, as they are determinants, to a greater
or lesser degree, of the factors that hypothetically have a bearing on the risk of criminal victimization, described in
Section 2.
Table 1 shows the names, definitions, means, and standard deviations of the variables.
4.  Preliminary  analysesFor household thefts/robberies, we see that 5.1% of individuals were victimized once in the one-year interval
considered in the surveys; 1.0% were victimized twice and 0.5% were victimized at least three times. For crimes of
theft/robbery of persons, the percentages were, 6.8%, 1.2%, and 0.4%, respectively (Table 2).
Table 2
Frequency of victimizations by type of theft/robbery.
Number of victimizations Household Persons
Frequency Frequency % Frequency Frequency %
0 4741 93.40 5113 91.61
1 257 5.06 378 6.77
2 51 1.00 66 1.18
3 27 0.53 24 0.43
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Table 3
Frequency of victimizations conditional on the categories of the qualitative control variables by type of theft/robbery.
Variable Categories Household Persons
0 1 0 1
gender 0 93.60 6.40 91.28 8.72
1 93.22 6.78 91.92 8.08
race 0 94.24 5.76 92.05 7.95
1 92.85 7.15 91.32 8.68
time 0 93.18 6.82 91.91 8.09
1 93.73 6.27 91.16 8.84
house 0 95.71 4.29
1 92.77 7.23
place 0 92.70 7.30
1 94.39 5.61
works 0 93.48 6.52
1 89.80 10.20
Note: The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1.
Table 4
Percentage of repeat victimizations conditional on the categories of the qualitative control variables by type of theft/robbery.
Variable Categories Household Persons
Number of victimizations
0 1 2 ≥3 0 1 2 ≥3
gender 0 93.60 4.62 1.16 0.62 91.28 7.00 1.35 0.37
1 93.22 5.46 0.87 0.45 91.92 6.57 1.03 0.48
race 0 94.24 4.07 1.09 0.60 92.05 6.71 0.93 0.31
1 92.85 5.72 0.95 0.49 91.32 6.82 1.35 0.51
time 0 93.18 5.33 0.99 0.50 91.91 6.52 1.15 0.41
1 93.73 4.67 1.02 0.58 91.16 7.16 1.23 0.46
house 0 95.71 3.38 0.64 0.27
1 92.77 5.53 1.11 0.60
place 1 92.70 5.75 1.14 0.40
0 94.39 4.09 0.81 0.71
works 0 93.48 5.39 0.84 0.29
1 89.80 8.12 1.52 0.56
N
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iote: The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1.
The low frequency of individuals who were victimized more than once during the period covered by the surveys
ade it impossible to develop a robust modelling of the determinants of repeat victimization through the estimation of
ount models as made, for instance, by Ybarra and Lohr (2002) and Carvalho and Lavor (2008). Nevertheless, for the
ole purpose of visualizing patterns in the data, apart from calculating certain statistics conditional on victimization,
e calculated other conditionals on the number of victimizations involving the same type of crime during the period
overed by the surveys.
Tables 3 and 4 show the frequency of victimization and repeat victimization, respectively, conditional on the
ategories of qualitative control variables.
Among individuals living in an apartment or gated community, 4.3% were victims of household theft or robbery.
ut among those who lived in regular houses the percentage was 7.2%. Therefore, living in an apartment or gated
ommunity seems to reduce the risk of victimization. It was also observed that the percentage of individuals who were
ictims of household theft/robbery was about 1.7 percentage points (pp) higher in areas with no slums nearby. This
uggests that these crimes tend to be committed at a distance from slums, in areas where wealth levels tend to be higher.
Regarding theft/robbery of persons, it was observed that the percentage of victimized individuals was much higher
n the group of individuals who worked outside the home (10.2%) than in the group of individuals who did not (6.5%).
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Table 5
Mean of the qualitative control variables conditional on victimization by type of theft/robbery.
Variable Household Persons
0 1 0 1
age 38.72 36.17 38.53 32.69
spending 356.75 392.72 352.08 446.83
Note: The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1.
Table 6
Mean of the qualitative control variables conditional on repeat victimization by type of theft/robbery.
Variable Household Persons
Number of victimizations
0 1 2 ≥3 0 1 2 ≥3
age 38.72 36.53 36.53 32.11 38.52 33.06 30.76 32.17
spending 356.75 386.22 402.29 436.43 352.08 455.41 424.52 373.01
Note: The definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1.This difference suggests that individuals engaged in a professional activity outside their home are exposed to a greater
risk of victimization.
With regard to gender, color and time, no differences that could be deemed relevant or significant for both type of
crimes were detected.
The same preliminary analyses about victimization, with changes only in the percent values presented, are valid for
repeat victimizations.
As for the average age of individuals, a clear pattern was detected both for victimizations and repeat victimizations
(Tables 5 and 6). Regardless of the type of crime, the average age of victimized individuals is lower than the average
age of non-victimized ones. The difference is more pronounced for theft/robbery of persons, whose victims are about
5.8 years younger than non-victimized individuals in average. Because this difference is relatively large, it is suspected
that younger individuals are more exposed to the risk of having something stolen/being robbed outside the home. This
suspicion grows stronger when one observes the behavior of age averages according to the number of victimizations
and sees that the average age is lower as the number of times that individuals are victimized increases.
As regards spending, the proxy for wealth observed by criminals, it can be seen that the mean of this variable
is higher among victimized individuals than among non-victimized ones. It can be observed that this difference is
more pronounced among victims and non-victims of theft/robbery of persons (Table 5). Specifically, in the case of
repeat victimization to household theft/robbery, it can be observed that the average spending is higher in the group of
individuals who were victimized twice than in that of individuals who were victimized once and that it is higher in the
group of individuals who were victimized at least three times than in the group of those who were victimized twice.
However, for theft/robbery of persons, a clear pattern can be observed between spending and repeat victimization
(Table 6). The differences observed in average spending among groups of victimized and non-victimized individuals
might indicate that wealth, proxied by spending, is one of the determinants of the risk of property victimization.
5.  Results
The results of the probit regressions by type of theft/robbery are reported in Table 7. Clearly, there are statistically
significant signs at conventional levels, positive and negative for the coefficients associated to the variables spending
and spending2, respectively. Thus, there is evidence in favor of the hypothesis tested in this study. This is a result that
supports the theoretical notes made by Gomes and Paz (2008).
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Table 7
Results of the estimations by type of theft/robbery and specification.
Variable Household Persons
Linear Quadratic Logarithmic Linear Quadratic Logarithmic
spending 0.001593* 0.0007279* 0.0002597* 0.0004771*
(0.0000541) (0.0002016) (0.0000486) (0.0000995)
spending2 −2.56e−07** −6.97e−08**
(1.07e−07) (3.22e−08)
ln(spending) 0.1417* 0.1994*
(0.03584) (0.02953)
age −0.007175* −0.007762* −0.007876* −0.016295* −0.01669* −0.01742*
(0.00177) (0.001798) (0.001799) (0.002664) (0.002655) (0.002669)
gender 0.002216 −0.004562 −0.005743 −0.1722 −0.1677 −0.1811
(0.05573) (0.05605) (0.05607) (0.1391) (0.1391) (0.1398)
race 0.1178** 0.0853 0.0866 0.07101 0.05114 0.02761
(0.05911) (0.06025) (0.06018) (0.007231) (0.0524) (0.053)
time −0.03578 −0.03285 −0.03449 0.0516 0.0764 0.07635
(0.05649) (0.05667) (0.05662) (0.007373) (0.0505) (0.05063)
house 0.3477* 0.3764* 0.3778*
(0.08394) (0.08399) (0.0828)
place −0.1642* −0.1404** −0.141**
(0.05939) (0.06031) (0.06009)
works 0.2076* 0.2013* 0.1877*
(0.05294) (0.05314) (0.0533)
age × gender 0.00129 0.001103 0.001462
(0.003781) (0.003779) (0.003791)
Constant −1.5754* −1.696* −2.2809* −1.01718* −1.047* −0.9436*
(0.1208) (0.1255) (0.2328) (0.1042) (0.1045) (0.1729)
Risk is maximized at spending 1421 3421
Pseudo R2 0.0181 0.0235 0.0223 0.0379 0.0400 0.0438
Wald test χ2(8) 41.68 51.21 49.08 104.10 113.52 122.81
Number of observations 5076 5076 5076 5581 5581 5581
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; the definitions of the variables are reported in Table 1; the results for the linear model for theft/robbery of
persons are the same obtained by Scorzafave et al. (2011).
s
i
f
f
a
p
v
o
t
e
v* Significance at 1%.
** Significance at 5%.
In addition, estimates obtained through two other specifications are reported: (a) without the quadratic term for
pending, that is, assuming that the alleged effect of wealth is linear14; (b) using the logarithm of spending.
The results suggest that the positive effect of spending, the proxy for observed wealth, on victimization risk is
ndependent from the specification that was used. It should be noticed that the change in how spending was controlled
or did not lead to significant changes in the values and levels of statistical significance of the coefficients estimated
or the other control variables. Moreover, the hypothesis of a positive, albeit not linear, relationship between wealth
nd risk of victimization is also supported when controlling by the variable ln(spending). The stability of the results
rovides strong evidence of their robustness.
Since the parabola is concave down, the function describing the estimated relationship between spending and
ictimization risk assumes a maximum value. Using the above-mentioned coefficients, it was estimated that the risk
f becoming a victim of household theft/robbery in relation to spending reaches its peak at 1422 reals. And for
heft/robbery of persons this peak was estimated at 3423 reals. These are values within the analysis interval.Fig. 1 shows the estimated relationship between victimization risk and spending. This calculation was done consid-
ring only statistically significant coefficients, changing the value of the variable spending  and keeping the other
ariables fixed at their sample mean values.
14 Exclusion of the quadratic term implies using the same set of regressors used by Scorzafave et al. (2011) in the theft/robbery of persons model.
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Fig. 1. Estimated relationship between spending (proxy for wealth observed by criminals) and the risk of property victimization (%).
Table 8
Frequency distribution of spending.
Spending ranges (reals in 2003) Frequency Frequency %
Less than 400 4253 76.18
400  800 835 14.96
800  1600 237 4.25
1600 and above 15 0.27
Total 5583 100.00Note: All the observations of the two victimization surveys were used.
Unfortunately, based on the spending frequency distribution reported in Table 8, it can be concluded that only a
small portion of citizens in the sample is in the descending part of these estimated curves. Specifically, only 3.2% of
the surveyed households spent more than 1422 reals and only 0.3% of them spent more than 3423 reals.
Table 9 shows the percentage marginal effects derived from changes in the values of the regressors of the model
with the quadratic specification for spending, as evaluated at their means.
Regarding the determinants of the individual becoming a victim of household theft/robbery, it was also concluded
that: (a) living in a house increases the risk of victimization by about 3.9 (pp) as compared to living in an apartment or
gated community; (b) the risk of victimization is approximately 1.7 pp lower for individuals living in slums, near slums,
or near projects as compared to those living in areas with slums nearby; and (c) the risk of victimization decreases by
about 0.1 pp for each additional year of age.
These results are consistent with those observed by Madalozzo and Furtado (2011) for the same type of crime,
differing only in the magnitude of the estimated marginal effects. Considering individuals residing in slums as the
control category, these authors arrived at the conclusion that living outside a slum (near a slum or far from a slum)
increases the risk of having one’s home stolen/robbed by approximately 2.7 pp; living in a house increases the risk of
victimization by about 1.6 pp as compared to living in an apartment or house in a gated community; the risk decreases
by circa 0.2 pp for each additional year over the average age of the members of the household. Peixoto et al. (2011)
also found a positive and statistically significant effect of the type of residence (house) and age on the likelihood of
becoming a victim of household theft/robbery. He reached the conclusion that living in a house increases the risk of
victimization and that older individuals are less likely to be victimized as compared to younger ones. Gomes (2011)
also concludes that living in a house increases the risk of becoming a victim of household theft/robbery and that if the
residence is located in a slum, near a slum or in a project, the risk of becoming a victim of this type of crime is lower as
compared to living farther from slums. In Scorzafave et al. (2011) significant negative and positive effects were found
for the age of the household head and type of residence, respectively.
With few exceptions, living in slums, near slums or in projects is a sign of low household wealth. According to
the principle of economic rationality, criminals choose households where there is more wealth to be stolen. In other
words, criminals expect to have greater gains for each crime committed in more affluent areas of the city. Based on a
preliminary analysis of the data made in Section 4, we suspected that this relationship was possible, considering that
the percentage of victims of this crime was much higher in the group of individuals living in areas with slums nearby.
M. Justus, A.L. Kassouf / EconomiA 14 (2013) 88–101 99
Table 9
Percentage marginal effects by type of theft/robbery (quadratic specification).
Variable Household Persons
spending 0.00881 0.00678
spending2 −3.10e−06 −9.91e−07
house 3.8765
place −1.6685
works 2.8616
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age −0.09389 −0.2373
otes: Only the marginal effects of variables with statistically significant coefficients have been reported (see Table 7).
herefore, the negative sign for the variable place  corresponds to the expected effect of the location on the risk of
ousehold theft/robbery. However, once observed wealth is controlled for through spending, the risk of victimization
hould be greater in areas with slums nearby. This indicates that observed wealth might not have been appropriately
ontrolled for. It should be considered that controls are almost invariably imperfect.
Another expected result, mainly based on common sense, is that the risk of household theft/robbery is lower for
partments or houses in gated communities than in ordinary houses. It is known that stealing or robbing goods from
 house is easier than committing such crimes in apartments or gated communities. Therefore, this is seen as further
ndirect evidence that criminals act rationally when choosing their victims by assessing potential gains and their risk
f being caught.
For theft/robbery of persons, the results are that the risk of victimization is 2.9 pp higher for individuals engaged
n work outside their home as compared to those who are not. The estimates indicate that each additional year of age
educes the risk of becoming a victim of crimes of this nature by about 0.2 pp. All these results and also the non-
ignificant coefficients observed for the other variables in the model are consistent, including in terms of the marginal
ffect’s magnitude, with the results observed in Scorzafave et al. (2011), even though no quadratic term for spending
as included.
It is seen as plausible that the effect of age on the risk of victimization is greater for theft/robbery of persons than
or household theft/robbery. Overall, younger individuals are more exposed to the risk of theft/robbery of persons than
lder ones. It should be noted as well that older individuals tend to adopt an even more cautious behavior after being
ictimized in any way. It is also true that younger individuals are much more exposed to criminals than older ones
ecause they go out more often to places and at times where the likelihood of criminals being caught in a criminal act
s lower.
It was expected that the risk of victimization for theft/robbery of persons would be higher for individuals who work
utside their home. This is so because such crimes are usually committed in public places where more individuals
sually work outside their home, such as, for example, in shopping streets and centers. Also in this case, empirical
vidence corroborates what was found in the preliminary analyses. In that section, it was seen that the percentage of
ictimized individuals is much higher in the group of individuals who worked outside their home.
It should be noted that, regardless of the type of theft/robbery, no statistically significant effects were detected for
he gender, color, and time variables. Such evidence of insignificance corroborates the little or almost no difference
bserved in the percentage of individuals victimized conditional on the categories of these variables. However, with
egard to the gender of an individual, our expectations, based on common sense, that women are easier victims of
heft/robbery of persons were not corroborated. For theft/robbery of persons also, the hypothesis of null effect of the
ariable for the interaction between gender and age that was not expected initially either cannot be rejected (Table 8).
Regarding the household theft/robbery, the non-significance of the coefficients of the dummy variables for gender,
olor, and time had already been observed in the estimations made by Madalozzo and Furtado (2011). Peixoto et al.
2011) also found a non-significant effect for color and time, but he observed a significant effect for gender. In the
arious models estimated by Gomes (2011), the coefficient of the dummy variable for time was statistically significant
n two only, in which an effort was made to control for an assumed spatial correlation between the households. In
corzafave et al. (2011), the coefficient estimated for the dummy variable for time was significant at conventionalevels of significance, but its magnitude is negligible. In this study, it was seen that gender is not a determinant of
ictimization risk and that the coefficient estimated for the dummy variable for Race was only statistically significant
t 10% level.
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6.  Concluding  remarks
This study was guided by the hypothesis that wealth influences the risk of an individual becoming a victim of property
crimes through two elements: economic attractiveness and protection capacity. In particular, we tested the hypothesis
that the observed relationship between wealth (approximated by spending) and the risk of property victimization is
positive, albeit nonlinear. This hypothesis was not rejected for the two types of crimes analyzed here: household
theft/robbery and theft/robbery of persons.
It can be indirectly inferred that non-rejection of the hypothesis investigated in this study indicates that the decision
to commit a crime is guided by economic rationality, as suggested by the economic theory on the causes of criminal
behavior. According to this theory, criminals assess their expected return before committing a crime, subjectively
computing potential gains and the likelihood of being caught.
The evidence on the nonlinear effect of spending on victimization risk strongly suggests that the economic status
of a family is a determinant not only of gains from crime, but also of its capacity to protect itself from crime.
According to the rational choice theory, there is a clear positive relationship between gains from crime and the
number of criminal occurrences, a hypothesis that has been tested empirically using the per capita household income
as proxy variable (Mendonc¸a et al., 2002; Santos and Kassouf, 2007; Santos, 2009, and many others). It has often been
argued that this variable is associated with both expected gains from and the opportunity cost of crime and, in addition,
according to Sjoquist (1973), income incorporates the opportunity cost if the criminal is punished with imprisonment.
However, the first effect has prevailed in empirical analyses to such an extent that, in most cases, a positive effect of
income on crime has been diagnosed. But the evidence found in this study suggests that it might be more appropriate to
control for a possible nonlinear effect of income on crime rates. In other words, based on the findings of this study, we
suggest that a quadratic term for the variable that measures household income should be included in the calculations.
We believe that this should be done because it determines both expected gains from crime and spending contributing
to prevent crime. Due to the lack of appropriate data, private investment to deter crime is not controlled for in the
estimations of models in which the crime rate is used as dependent variable. Therefore, including a quadratic term for
the variable intended to control for expected gains from crime can be a good alternative to indirectly control for private
efforts to deter criminal behavior.
As for public policies designed to reduce crime levels, we believe, on the one hand, that measures adopted by the
State should focus on factors that increase the opportunity cost of crime, discouraging more individuals from becoming
criminals and recidivism. On the other hand, it is imperative to increase the likelihood of failure for hardened criminals
in committing crimes. This can be done through public security policies designed to increase the efficiency of public
security institutions. It is also necessary to put measures in place to reduce underreporting of crimes, as knowing the
actual crime rate is crucial for the competent authorities to make informed decisions on earmarking resources for public
safety. Finally, if this is not done, society will bear the burden of preventing victimizations by adopting an increasingly
cautious behavior and spending part of its wealth on its safety, which is constitutionally a duty of the State.
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